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LEGISLATION BY THE COURTS 
It is remarkable that in this second century of the republic 
our courts should be so vehemently assailed for interference in 
legislation. One who knew of our duplex governments only by 
study of their written constitutions would open his eyes when 
told that there is any such thing under them as legislation by 
the courts. The citizen of Nebraska lives under a constitution 
which devotes an entire article to declaring, not only that the 
executive, legislative, and judicial departments of its state 
government are and must be kept distinct, but that no person 
in anyone of them, except as specially authorised, shall exercise 
powers properly belonging to another department. The federal 
constitution does not go quite so far. It merely provides that 
" all legislative power" shall be vested in Congress, "the executive 
power" in a President, and "the judicial power" in one supreme 
court and such inferior ones as Congress shall provide, each in a 
separate article of that venerated instrument. 
The first of state constitutions, the one with which the colony 
of New Hampshire started out in March, 1776, was too brief 
and provisional to do much more than simply to provide a new 
executive on the" sudden and abrupt departure of his Excellency, 
John Wentworth, Esq., our late governor." The other institu-
tions of the colony were left pretty much as they were and no 
mention was then made of the courts. But when the good citi-
zens of that colony found as one of the results of Governor 
Wentworth's "abrupt and sudden departure" that they were 
wholly freed from any danger of his return or of the coming of 
any other royal successor, they proceeded to make a constitution 
which was a real instrument of government, and not a mere 
provisional arrangement formed on the recommendation of the 
Continental Congress "to secure peace and good order during 
the continuance of the dispute with Great Britain." 
In that constitution of 1784 we find: "In the government of 
this state, the three essential powers thereof, to-wit, the legis-
lative, executive, and judicial, ought to be kept as separate from 
and independent of each other as the nature of a free government 
will admit or as is consistent with that chain of connection that 
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binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble 
bond of union and amity." It is clear that when our constitu-
tion making began in 1776 Montesquieu's doctrine that such a 
separation of the three great powers was necessary to the preser-
vation of liberty was, on paper at least, fully accepted. The 
Virginia constitution of June, 1776, declared: "The legislative, 
executive, and judiciary departments shall be separate and 
distinct so that neither shall exercise the powers properly belong-
ing to the other; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more 
than one of them at the same time; except that justices of the 
county courts shall be eligible to either house of the assembly." 
Something of the same kind, often in identical or equivalent 
phrases, exists in all the original constitutions prepared under 
the suggestion of the Continental Congress, which had recom-
mended the form of state governments and "the suppression 
of English royal authority" as early as November 4, 1775. 
Not only did these constitutions contain such a declaration 
of intention to keep the powers separate, but nearly all of them 
contained a clause that reads as if it were specially aimed at an 
authority since then universally asserted by and allowed to our 
courts, that of declaring laws void because unconstitutional. 
The Virginia declaration of rights of June 12, 1776, declares: 
"All power of suspending laws or the execution of laws by any 
authority without consent of the representatives of the people 
is injurious to their rights and ought not to be exercised." 
Unquestionably this was in fact intended to assail the author-
ityof the English crown and of a parliament in which the colo-
nists were not represented, to change fundamentally the legal 
system under which the colonies had been formed. It reads, 
however, precisely as if intended to forbid the voiding of laws 
by the courts, whether for unconstitutionality or other reason. 
Such an interpretation is further suggested by the declaration 
just preceding: " The legislative and executive powers of the 
state should be separate and distinct from the judiciary, and that 
the members of the two first may be restrained from oppression 
. by feeling and participating the burdens of the people, they should 
at fixed periods be reduced into that body from which they were 
originally taken and the vacancies supplied by frequent, certain, 
and regular elections--." The election of a fresh legislature 
to repeal, not a court to annul, is the suggested remedy for 
wrongful legislation. 
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Notwithstanding all this, as fast as the question arose for 
determination in the states, and in Virginia itself before I787, 
their highest courts determined that their constitutions were 
laws, supreme laws, to be interpreted by the courts whenever 
a litigant's personal or property rights were involved, and so 
the courts were converted into a means of "suspending" acts 
passed by the legislature. They did this with the entire approval 
of the mass of the citizens in all the commonwealths. 
Probably the fact that at the outbreak of the dispute with 
Great Britain the constitutionality and therefore the validity 
of the acts of parliament providing for the so-called writs of 
assistance had been vehemently assailed by Otis before the 
Massachusetts judges, and the further fact that the revolution 
itself had been brought on in resistance to parliament rather 
than as rebellion against King George, made the colonists more 
ready to apply English precedents of successful use of legal rules 
against royal authority to the voiding of legislative acts. At 
any rate, wherever the question had arisen in the colonies before 
the Federal Constitutional Convention, the courts had sustained 
their own authority to interpret the provisions of the constitu-
tions and had asserted the invalidity, as against private rights, 
of all legislation which was found to be clearly contrary to such 
provisions. 
The view as to this matter which was current when the federal 
constitution was under consideration, sufficiently appears in The 
Federalist, No. 78. 
Perhaps the most notable thing about that paper is Hamil-
ton's skill in putting himself and his associates on the popular 
side. He shows that the judiciary are the least dangerous of 
governmental functionaries. They hold neither the sword nor 
the purse. The first is in the hands of the President; the second 
in those of Congress. The judiciary have only judgment and 
must depend on the executive ann for the enforcement of that. 
Farther on he calls attention to the fact that if he and his associ-
ates are insisting that the courts shall assert the provisions of 
the constitution against an act of the legislature even if supported 
by a majority of the people themselves as well as of the legislature, 
the supporters of the new constitution are not like their opponents 
denying the people's right to make changes or abolish their own 
constitution. "But it is easy to see that it would require an 
uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as 
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faithful guardians of the constitution where the legislative in-
vasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the com-
munity," he adds. He contends that the possessing of this 
power by the courts does not show any superiority of the courts 
to the legislatures, but only the superiority of the people to both. 
In answer to the assertion that the judges would be given 
the opportunity to substitute their own will for the constitu-
tionally expressed will of the legislature in holding the act bad 
when they merely disliked the legislation, he replies that such 
an opportunity always occurs when a matter is left to a court 
to decide; but that all experience shows that intentional and 
serious departures, on the part of the courts, from any clear 
rule of law are very rare. He might have added that the logical 
development of any rule in the process of applying it to new and 
unforeseen occasions inevitably lays over it a line of ever-widen-
ing glosses. This process is so inevitably necessary that it is 
safe to say that no great legal system ever developed without 
a great court. Such systems have been made with small help 
from legislation. English law is the work of English judges of 
whose labours we inherit the result. Of the civil law of Rome, 
which divides with English law the sway of the globe, is it the 
prretor's edict or the fragments of legislation by comitia and 
senate which furnish the backbone? 
The English courts backed by their royal organisers first 
created the body of common law. They had it well under way 
before parliaments began. Then they added with royal assist-
ance and approval the stately jurisdiction of equity. This latter 
was well advanced when they took up the law merchant and its 
rules and made that, too, a part of their polity. Still parliament 
was occupied with politics and administration and had given 
small attention to legislation. It had, however, discovered by 
this time that such a great instrument of authority could no 
longer be safely left wholly with the king. In providing for his 
successors by the act of settlement, though leaving the power of 
appointment with the king, they made the judge's office one for 
life subject to removal on a joint resolution of the two houses of 
parliament. 
The non-exercise of this power during almost a hundred years 
seems to have caused it to have been ignored by the constitution-
makers at Philadelphia in 1787. It seems not to have been men-
tioned in their deliberations, though it is referred to by Madison 
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in The Federalist and had been inserted in the l\1assachusetts 
constitution of 1780. There it has been carried in reserve, like 
the extra tire of an automobile, without once coming into use 
from that day to this. So completely has it been forgotten that 
the current agitation as to the recall has scarcely brought it into 
view. 
With such a history of their judicial ancestry behind them, 
brought into existence by the colonial struggle' against parlia-
ment, supported by the overflowing individualism of current 
public sentiment as well as by the complete success of the new 
state constitutions in their field of local government, the asser-
tion of the judicial power to pass on the constitutionality of 
legislation was inevitable. For years no attempt was made to 
answer Hamilton's question-begging proposition that such a 
power is inseparable from written limitations on powers of 
government. 
Indeed, it was apparently not foreseen even by Hamilton 
what a potent instrument towards fashioning legislation it could 
be made and was destined to become. Blackstone's notion that 
the common law had been perfected and was entirely adequate 
to the needs of society, that most of it had come down from time 
immemorial, and with the slight changes he suggested would 
remain intact and sufficient for still longer ages to come, seems 
to have been pretty generally the view held in those days and 
shared in even by the writers of The Federalist. They affirmed 
in No. 62 of that work that "facility and excess of law-making 
seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most 
liable." In No. 48 Madison quotes Jefferson's Notes on Virginia 
to show that experience in that state evinced encroachments by 
the legislature on the domain of the judiciary, "and the direction 
of the executive during the whole time of their session is becoming 
habitual and familiar." With such feelings toward legislatures, 
the constitution-makers naturally relied upon the courts to 
maintain that natural law of property which the constitutions 
recognised. The courts did not disappoint them, but assumed 
the new jurisdiction with all alacrity and have sometimes pushed 
it beyond bounds. 
Of course, it was after all only an extension of the task of 
interpretation and application by which from time immemorial 
the courts have built up legal systems. The modem legislator, 
to be sure, finds his best intentions thwarted by unsympathetic 
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courts which say that his employer's liability law interferes with 
the constitutional rights of the employed to sell his labour on 
his own terms; or which declare the combination in restraint of 
interstate traq.e which his law punishes can only be the unreason-
ably restrictive combination which common law pronounces 
illegal. His most ancient brother, however, had similar troubles. 
Solon himself, says Plutarch, was so troubled by those who 
called upon him for interpretations of his code that he sailed 
away for ten years to permit his fellow-citizens, who had sworn 
to observe it for a hundred years, time to get used to its pro-
visions before his return. His troubles on that score were not 
renewed. His laws were too far gone in abeyance when he came 
back. Aristotle tells us that equity must be resorted to in order 
that those things wherein the enacted law fails because of its 
too great generality may be corrected in the individual cases. 
Did not Justinian forbid any commentary on his code and find 
the prohibition vain? Did not Napoleon on learning that a 
commentary on his code was soon to appear, exclaim, "My code 
is lost"? His anticipations were in a large degree well founded. 
A distinguished French judge declared in Paris: "No judge to-
day in 1904, not even the presiding one in the High Court of 
Cassation, would say that his sole duty is to examine persistently 
as to what is the meaning which a hundred years ago the 
framers of the code attached to this or that article. He ought to 
say that in the presence of all the changes which during the nine-
teenth century have taken place in the ideas, institutions, eco-
nomic conditions and social status of France, justice and reason 
command a liberal and humane adaptation of the text to the 
realities and requirements of modem life." 
Doubtless, wherever we might go throughout the history 
of lawgiving, we should find the lawgiver colliding with the judge; 
for time will keep turning up new combinations, at least new 
to that lawgiver and to those administering his rules. The new 
point must be passed upon; and when that is done, something 
will have been added to the rule or taken from its possibilities. 
For the next case will under any system, or all of them, be con-
sidered not merely in the light of that rule, but in that of the 
former application of it as well. 
Why, indeed, should the case of two parties litigating over 
railroad rates be settled, or why should any attempt be made 
to settle it, by a clause of Napoleon's code published before 
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Stephenson's locomotive was so much as thought of? The 
truth is that genuine justice is deaf as well as blind. She neither 
sees with her own eyes nor hears with her own ears, but with 
those of the parties before her. It is not a question of what code-
drafters or precedent-makers of preceding centuries who had 
neither knowledge nor anticipation of these parties or of their 
situation, thought or intended. The question in reference to 
codes or precedents, which justice asks, is, what did these parties 
at the time of the transaction out of which the dispute comes, 
fairly and reasonably understand and expect from those pro-
visions and precedents and the situation as modified by them? 
If justice and its ministers are to have any respect among live 
and thinking men, that is the question which they must answer. 
That the answer is liable to be something startlingly unlike 
what was in the original lawgiver's mind, is a simple result of 
the eternal flux of sublunary things. 
" Time like an ever rolling stream 
Sweeps all its sons away." 
Let us hope and believe that it brings better in their places. 
That the unintended consequences of any considerable social 
adjustment are much more important than the intended ones, 
is one of the commonest of commonplaces. Beyond all doubt 
it will remain so, as long as in those matters about which men 
concern themselves, the portion which can be definitely foreseen 
and controlled is small, compared with that which cannot. 
Witness the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. 
Observation of results from the income-tax provision, and from 
that for popular election of senators, in our new sixteenth and 
seventeenth ones, gives a fresh interest to existence. Indeed, 
the difficulty of the judge's task of clearly apprehending the 
changes which time has already made in former legal conceptions 
and relations ought effectually to deter him from trying to 
introduce any of his own. 
An accentuation of the difficulty which has always beset the 
legislator arises when his countrymen have for ages lived under 
a system derived from the judicial application, adaptation, and 
supplementing of spontaneous customs with small interference 
of the legislator so that the doctrine that precedent makes law 
is thoroughly wrought into the social fabric. When to this is 
added the crowning judicial authority. to declare legislative 
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enactments unconstitutional, the modern legislator who wants 
to enact laws, some of which are in fact infringetpents upon 
constitutional provisions, takes not to the woods, as the authors 
of The Federalist and the other constitution-makers seem to 
have intended and expected, but to the referendum. 
Those who cite constitutions and decisions are taken at their 
word. Their adherence to the letter of the constitution is "not 
putting courts above legislatures, but merely putting the people 
above both." Very well, let us have the people's own say-so 
as to whether or not these changes shall be made. The referen-
dum and the initiative are a well-planned effort to develop a 
legislative force that shall not be shackled by constitutional 
restrictions. This modem legislator is even more impatient 
of the judicial curb than have been his predecessors, but he is 
bound to feel it, and his work, too, will go into the judicial 
hopper. 
In truth, his own advantages and energy are augmented as 
compared with those of his predecessors even more than the 
judicial opposition has been strengthened. If de Tocqueville 
were still alive, his "sort of religious terror" at the irresistible 
advance of democracy and at the way in which every discovery 
and invention, from that of gunpowder to the telephone, help 
it on, would certainly be deepened. Social consequences, as 
distinguished from the material and the intellectual ones, of 
those discoveries are only beginning to show themselves, and 
they are giving the legislator his opportunity and responsibility. 
He is at outs with the constitutions along two main lines. 
Those constitutions are framed upon the basis of a civil law that 
recognised a natural right of property which was not derived 
from government and which government itself was bound to 
respect. They were based upon the idea of a criminal law 
which was set up to preserve the public peace, King's peace it 
had been, as a substitute and satisfaction for personal vengeance 
for wrongs. Its fundamental conception was retribution upon 
the wrong-doer. The conception and feeling under both civil 
and criminal law and its administration have changed. Both 
are now justified on the basis of social necessity and welfare. 
The basis of property is no longer, if it ever was, the one 
which Adam Smith adopted, the individual's right to himself and 
to the product of his own activities. Rather it is prior legitimate 
possession admitted and upheld for the good of society. The 
THE MID-WEST QUARTERLY 
modem legislator wishes to modify in many ways the legal 
status of property and finds the constitutions and the courts 
in his way. 
In 1893 Congress enacted an income tax. A similar one had 
been laid during the civil war and upheld. The'federal court, 
however, changed its ruling and held the law bad because it 
proVided for a direct tax and was not apportioned as federal 
direct taxes are required to be. The sovereign people thought 
that the decision was unduly influenced by the fact that small 
incomes were exempt and by fear of further steps towards throw-
ing the burden of taxation upon large incomes. The dread 
popular sovereign, whose slumber Dicey said it took the cannon 
of the civil war to break, came forth and wiped off the decision 
by means of the sixteenth amendment to the federal constitution. 
He can almost be heard from Washington asking the judges if 
the income tax in the new tariff bill is not beyond their reach. 
The ground for complaints of excessive interference by the 
courts in the domain of legislation is thus explained in part, at 
all events, by the qualities of human nature which in all times 
and all countries have produced legal tribunals and induced 
their activity and did so long before like qualities developed for-
mal legislation. In part such interferences are due to the special 
characteristics of a judge-fqunded, if not a judge-made system, 
where precedent has the f011ce of law, a system in which a great 
judge was able to say with applause instead of rebuke, "I 
recognise nothing as an authority in the law except such a case 
so decided," a system in which the introduction at a political 
crisis of written constitutions attempting to set the courts wholly 
apart from legislative activity was only an occasion for a further 
extension of the powers of the tribunals. Made by those con-
stitutions a co-ordinate branch of the government, they were 
bidden by the prevailing individualism to enforce the guaranties 
of private rights in the same constitutions and to declare void 
any legislation infringing them. 
Then came the shifting of public sentiment in both the domain 
of property rights and that of criminal justice; and it would seem 
that the discontent with lawyers and courts who naturally 
continue on the old course until it reaches an impasse is pretty 
well explained. 
Nevertheless something more remains to be said .... Once 
upon a time a social party of guests fell to talking of personal 
LEGISLATION BY THE COURTS 141 
appearance as exhibiting age. One of them with a tacit claim 
of youth, gave a number of explanatory circumstances to account 
for the visible marks of wear in his case. His recital of special 
hardships, trying employments, anxiety, and sickness, seemed 
fully to account for his condition till one of the others impolitely 
asked: "Have n't you left out one important reason for your 
agingappearance?" "I think not. What one?" "Why, the 
fact that you are pretty blessed old." 
It is possible, notwithstanding the many other good means 
of accounting for tlie complaints about the courts' presence in 
the field of legislation, that they may have sometimes been 
there unwarrantably. As to this, let a few additional facts be 
submitted to a not always candid world. 
In 1819 came up in the United States Supreme Court the 
question of the right of the state of Ivlaryland to put a special 
stamp tax on the notes taken within its boundaries by a branch 
of the Bank of the United States. This bank had a branch 
making loans and taking deposits in Baltimore. A state law 
required all banks not chartered by Maryland to put a state 
treasury stamp upon every note taken. This was aimed at the 
United States bank. The latter's manager, McCulloch, dis-
regarded such requirement and was sued for the penalty. The 
state court assessed that penalty upon him. The State Supreme 
Court affirmed it and he appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland. It was held not 
merely that this special requirement of a tax not laid upon the 
Maryland banks was bad, but that ~faryland could not tax 
the United States bank at all. 
When the present system of national banks was organised 
Congress found this rule established and provided that such 
banks should pay the same taxes to state and local authorities 
as should be assessed upon other similar property in the localities. 
This provision was held to be constitutional. That is, there 
was no constitutional difficulty in the way of making a United 
States corporation, voluntarily locating itself and its business 
within a state, pay its share of local taxes. Only the consent 
of Congress to such taxation must be first obtained. Of course, 
if Congress had authority to incorporate the bank, it could adjust 
the terms; but state and national governments were intended 
to work together and surely there could be no good reason for 
freeing these national corporations from local taxes, unless it 
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was expressly so provided as in the case of national bonds or 
other United States securities. 
A fear that Congress would not adequately protect national 
corporations from state legislation is the only rational ground 
for stretching the constitution so as to make it impliedly forbid 
such taxation by the states. Similar provisions in the constitu-
tion of the Australian commonwealth were, on the authority 
of our decision, held by the Supreme Court of the commonwealth 
to exempt the salary of a post-office official from state tax at 
Melbourne, but on appeal to the Privy Council that great court 
promptly held that McCulloch v. Maryland was not a good 
precedent, and that as long as no special exaction was made, the 
commonwealth official should pay his income tax with other 
people. In other words, the Privy Council found that the com-
monwealth Supreme Court, as well as our own, had legislated 
an exemption to the federal officer instead of applying the 
constitution. 
In 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden, the United States Supreme 
Court was called upon to say whether the Fulton and Livingston 
franchise for the exclusive steam navigation of New York waters, 
granted to them under nearly a dozen acts of the New York 
legislature, empowered their assignee, Ogden, to enjoin Gibbons 
from running his steamship from Elizabeth, New Jersey, into 
New York harbour. Gibbons had a coaster's license under 
federal law to make such trips. Chancellor Kent held that 
New York had the right to make any regulations of New York 
waters that it pleased, so long as they did not contravene any 
regulation by Congress, and also held that the coasting license 
was a mere permission on the part of the United States to make 
the voyage without any interference on the part of the federal 
government, and gave no rights as against the New York fran-
chise. His brave language does not, however, conceal his uncer-
tainty on this latter point. He granted the injunction. 
On Gibbons' appeal Chief Justice 1\larshall found that the 
Fulton exclusive franchise was inconsistent with the congres-
sional provision for coasting licenses and as the power of Congress 
over interstate navigation was admittedly supreme, he dissolved 
the injunction on this ground. He says, however, that there is 
great force in the argument that the constitution alone, in grant-
ing to the federal Congress power to regulate, excludes, without 
any action by Congress, all direct action upon interstate or 
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foreign commerce by the states; and he adds, "the court is not 
satisfied that it has been refuted." The case on this basis is 
constantly cited as holding that the constitution of itself pre-
cludes the states from regulations affecting commerce. Marshall 
seems to have intended it should. 
Meanwhile the opinion itself recognises that no important 
police regulation can be adopted by any state without liability 
of affecting foreign and interstate commerce. Indeed, the whole 
function of policing such commerce is primarily thrown on the 
state within which it occurs, as well as is the duty to provide 
against the endangering through such commerce of the safety 
of the community. Over the wholly internal transactions of 
the people of the state, the federal government has no authority. 
Over the purely foreign and interstate commerce, the state on 
this doctrine has none. But such commerce carried on within 
a state consists precisely in the foreign article or person entering 
into relations with native articles and persons. These latter 
cannot be subjected to local authority, while the commerce is 
going on, without affecting the former. There you have the 
situation. What is the remedy? l\ianifestly and simply, to 
make the authority of the two governments concurrent and make 
the national one supreme if they conflict. 
This is the practical solution in commercial matters as it was 
in taxation. The doctrine of exclusive regulatory power in 
Congress has established a neutral zone wherein there can be no 
effective legislation except by identical exactments by both 
state and federal governments, as in the case of the pure food 
laws. Chancellor Kent in Ogden v. Gibbons expressed the belief 
that not only the language but the purpose of the federal consti-
tution was satisfied by holding the power of the state unimpaired 
except where Congress had acted. In case of any really injurious 
action by any state the complete remedy was in the hands of 
Congress. Not the paralysing of the state, but supremacy in 
Congress if they clash, was all that was called for. 
In 1888 the state of Iowa had in force a law forbidding the 
sale of malt liquors. A. J. Hardin, a constable at Keokuk, 
seized some barrels and cases of beer in that town which Gus 
Leisy & Co., of Peoria, had sent there under charge of an agent 
for sale. Leisy & Co. brought suit for their beer and got judg-
ment for it on the ground that the Iowa law under which it had 
been seized was unconstitutional. Hardin appealed to the 
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Supreme Court of his state which rendered judgment in his 
favour, and Leisy & Co. appealed from this to the federal Su-
preme Court. That court held that Leisy & Co. were engaged 
in interstate commerce with which Iowa could not interfere. It 
set aside Hardin's judgment and reinstated the first one in favour 
of Leisy&Co. Again, as in the taxation matter, Congress upheld 
the state's action. It provided in the Wilson act of 1891 that 
anyone, taking liquors into a state, shall be liable to state 
laws as soon as the liquors are offered for sale. The judicial 
extension converting a grant of authority into one of exclusive 
authority, was not found to work well. 
Of course, there was more litigation. The liquor-sellers and 
their lawyers were prompt in urging that if the respective fields 
of authority of the states and of Congress were fixed in the con-
stitution, and the states excluded by it, Congress could not let 
them in. Judge Marshall, however, had remarked that Congress 
could adopt state legislation. It was concluded that this could 
be done in advance. The liquor-dealers' contention was therefore 
not upheld. 
Unquestionably a leading, if not the leading motive to the 
adoption of the federal constitution, was the clearing of commerce 
from the burden of troublesome restrictions by the states; but 
it is at least equally true that the intention was to leave the 
authority of the states in all respects as little impaired as possible. 
Prohibitions are somewhat liberally applied to the states in 
Section 10 of Art. 1. of the federal constitution and elsewhere 
with none as to this regulating of commerce. The clause itself 
which makes acts of Congress supreme refers to and anticipates 
state legislation. I t would seem that the critics of the courts 
have some ground for saying that this whole line of decisions 
and the practical troubles over them grow out of anxiety lest 
Congress would not by proper legislation maintain the free inter-
course between the states, and out of a more or less conscious 
determination of the court to do so itself. In all of these great 
constitutional cases, the doing of the true work of a court, the 
securing of genuine justice for the particular parties before it, 
seems to have been the least of its concerns. 
Into the turbid waters stirred up by the Dred Scott case, it 
is not worth our while to go. There is not space here for leaving 
even a new misunderstanding. That case and the fate of the 
great judge who contributed the most to it ought to be a sufficient 
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warning against conscious attempts on the part of the tribunals 
of justice to effect political adjustments. How about the relative 
importance of foreseen and of unanticipated results in that case? 
How much concern was there in the minds of either the concur-
ring or the dissenting judges as to Scott's own fate? The income-
tax cases have been mentioned. Others might be, if space 
permitted. 
What has been said might lead to the conclusion that the 
federal courts have been especially notable for pushing into the 
legislator's field. Nothing of the kind is intended or would be 
justified. The United States Supreme Court, having to apply 
a new constitution and aid in establishing a new polity by means 
of a judicial authority new in the world, was necessarily drawn 
towards, if not into, political questions. The state courts have 
been as much so with far less ground, or excuse, if we take the 
condemnatory view. If political discussions in this country, as 
has been often remarked, take on the legal form, for instance the 
constitutional right to take slaves into the territories, judicial 
opinions too often become a mere consideration of consequences 
to flow from the precedent which will result from the decision. 
In truth, the difficulty, under such a system, of getting a 
tolerable regard for the rights and interests of the individual 
litigants within any reasonable time, is one of the main grounds 
of complaint. The remedy seems to be plain. Make in this 
country as distinct a separation between the administration of 
justice to individuals, based on their past transactions, and the 
political adjustment of affairs for the future, as has been secured 
in England, and we may hope for good sense, honesty, and public 
spirit enough to exhibit at least an equal degree of success in our 
own courts. In that event the arrival of the popular sovereign 
with the initiative and the referendum to take politics and legis-
lation in some degree out of the tribunals of justice, will certainly 
not prove an unmixed evil. 
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